#Asteroid #Meteorite Crash! 10 Biggest Impact #Craters on Earth!

Crash! 10 Biggest Impact Craters on EarthBecky Oskin | Senior Writer | LIVE SCIENCE | April 28, 2014

Ancient scars

Credit: Science

Ancient scars

Whether they’re the size of a molehill or a mountain, meteorite impacts are one of the most destructive forces in the solar system. Here on Earth, flying space debris triggered mass extinctions, but the same deadly asteroids might also have delivered the seeds of life soon after Earth was born. The effects of asteroid impacts linger for billions of years. Here are the 10 biggest impact craters known, from largest to smallest.


Vredefort crater

Credit: NASA

1: Vredefort crater

The oldest impact crater on Earth is also the largest. Vredefort crater in South Africa, also called the Vredefort Dome, was originally 185 miles (300 kilometers) across, scientists estimate. A meteorite or asteroid bigger than South Africa’s Table Mountain blasted out the giant crater 2.02 billion years ago.


Sudbury crater

Credit: NASA

2: Sudbury crater

Sudbury crater in Ontario, Canada, clocks in at 81 miles (130 km) wide and 1.85 billion years old, close in age and size to Vredefort crater in South Africa. The original crater is believed to have sprawled 160 miles (260 km). Rock fragments from the impact have been found in Minnesota, over 500 miles (800 km) away.


Chicxulub crater

Credit: LPI

3: Chicxulub crater

Chicxulub crater’s discovery clinched what was once a wild theory: that a meteor impact wiped out the dinosaurs. A thin layer of exotic iridium metal from a meteor impact had been detected worldwide at Cretaceous mass extinction before Chicxulub was found. Now, the meteorite that carved the Chicxulub crater in Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula is widely thought to have caused or greatly contributed to the mass extinction at the end of the Cretaceous 65 million years ago, including the end of the dinosaurs. Some scientists think Chicxulub’s original crater may have been bigger than Sudbury crater in Ontario. Estimates of its original diameter range up to 150 miles (240 km) in diameter, and its current size is 93 miles (150 km).


Popigai crater

Credit: NASA

4: Popigai crater

A rare find is buried in Russia’s Popigai crater: diamonds. Some 35 million years ago, a meteorite crashed into carbon-rich graphite rock deposits in Siberia, and the impact’s immense pressures and temperatures converted the carbon into diamonds. The crater is 62 miles (100 km) wide and holds massive diamond reserves, according to the Russian government.


Manicouagan crater

Credit: Landsat

5: Manicouagan crater

Our first lake-filled crater, Manicouagan in Quebec is one the largest and best-preserved crater on the planet. The 62-mile-wide (100 km) crater is 214 million years old.


Acraman crater

Credit: NASA Earth Observatory

6: Acraman crater

Lake Acraman fills this round impact crater, excavated 580 million years ago in South Australia. The crater measures 56 miles (90 kilometers) in diameter. Impact ejecta from the crater can be found in the Flinders Range 185 miles (300 km) to the east, among rocks with fossils of the first complex life forms on Earth.

Chesapeake Bay crater


7: Chesapeake Bay crater

Buried under seafloor muds, Chesapeake Bay Crater offshore of Virginia is an estimated 35 million years old. The curving western shoreline of Chesapeake Bay takes its shape from the 53-mile-wide (85 km) marine crater. A drilling core revealed the first hints that a large impact crater was buried beneath the bay in 1983, when the core brought up an 8-inch-thick (20 centimeters) layer of impact ejecta.


Morokweng crater

Credit: J.Hills/Science Museum London

8: Morokweng crater

Morokweng Crater is buried beneath South Africa’s Kalahari Desert: Geologists discovered it through remote sensing surveys. But scientists got a surprise when they drilled into the crater looking for rock samples to confirm the impact. The remains of the meteorite that created this crater were still in its depth. The drill brought back a 10-inch (25 centimeter) fragment of the original meteorite from about 842 yards (770 meters) below the surface. Morokweng formed 145 million years ago and is 44 miles (70 km) wide.


Kara crater

Credit: NASA Earth Observatory.

9: Kara crater

Kara crater is a 70.3-million-year-old eroded crater exposed in Russia’s Yugorsky Peninsula. Researchers think the 40-mile-wide (65 km) crater was once more than 75 miles (120 km) in diameter.


Beaverhead crater

Credit: USDA

10: Beaverhead crater

This 600-million-year-old crater spans Montana and Idaho and is the second-largest impact crater in the United States. Little remains at the surface of the 37-mile-wide (60 km) crater, which wasn’t discovered until the 1990s. That’s when shatter cones — cone-shaped, violently-shocked rock — were found in Beaverhead in southwestern Montana. The crater is centered in Challis, Idaho.




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#CA #MisfeasanceInPublicOffice #MaliciousProsecution #Reasonableness



In the judgment in Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587 the Court of Appeal overturned a finding that a police force was not liable for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office because the errant officer “believed” in the guilt of the accused.


To say that DCS Cook, a prosecutor guilty of perverting the course of justice by creating false evidence against the appellants, was, on account of his belief in their guilt, not acting maliciously, is rather like saying that Robin Hood was not guilty of theft. One understands the motivation in each case, but any seeming endorsement of such dishonest behaviour, particularly within the police force, leads as McCombe LJ puts it, to a (serious and unacceptable) “negation of the rule of law.”



The three claimants had been charged with a murder than took place in 1987.  They were in custody for a considerable period before the criminal case against them was discontinued.  The bulk of the case against them came from the evidence of one witness.



The trial judge found that a police officer, DCS Cook, had contaminated the evidence of the “key witness”.


    1. As I have said, the statements made by Eaton were a major plank of the Crown case against the appellants. I will return below to the extent to which he implicated each appellant, according to the findings of Mitting J. The salient feature of the present proceedings, however, and the salient reason why Maddison J decided to exclude Eaton’s evidence from the appellants’ prospective trial, was that the Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”), Detective Chief Superintendent David Cook (“DCS Cook”) was found to have compromised the de-briefing of Eaton by making and receiving an extensive number of unauthorised direct contacts with Eaton in the period leading up to Eaton’s making of his statements, in contravention of express procedures for keeping a “sterile corridor” between the debriefing officers and the investigation team. In the course of the debriefing process, Eaton moved from being unwilling to name directly any of the participants in the murder to naming the three appellants and giving his graphic (as it turned out obviously inaccurate) description of the murder scene.”


The trial judge found that DCS Cook had committed the crime of doing an act tending to and intending to pervert the course of justice.


“187. [I]t is inescapable that Cook did deliberately breach both guidelines and express instructions from his superiors which he knew would be likely to undermine the integrity of the evidence of the potential witness Eaton. Further, what he did put the admissibility of the evidence of Eaton at risk, as in fact happened. …[H]e contaminated the source of justice. He knew what he was doing and did it deliberately. He can therefore be taken to have intended to do it. The ingredients of the crime were present.


However the trial judge found

  • DCS Cooke was not a prosecutor.
  • DCS Cooke was not malicious because, “…even if his methods are open to criticism, his motive was not: it was to bring those he believed to be complicit in the Morgan murder…to justice”: paragraph 179 of the judgment.
  • There would have been a prosecution anyway.
  • That there was misfeasance in public office but the claimants had not suffered any damage.



The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s conclusions as to the law in most respects, finding for the claimants. In relation to the argument that the claimants would have been prosecuted in any event. Lord Justice McCombe observed:-

  1. I believe that, from what I have said already, it can be seen that I respectfully disagree with these reasons. For my part, I am prepared to accept that there was admissible evidence, over and above that of Eaton, which might just have passed the test of being a case to answer by the appellants. However, in the absence of evidence from the sources mentioned, we are in as good a position as the judge to determine whether (on the balance of probabilities) a prosecution would have been brought on the date it was (23 April 2008), if it was known a) that Eaton’s evidence would not have been admissible at trial and b) that the reason why it would not have been admissible was that the SIO in the case had obtained that evidence by committing the crime of doing an act tending to and intending to pervert the course of justice.
  2. As I have said elsewhere already, I find that it is inconceivable that any properly informed prosecutor, or counsel advising him or her, would have countenanced the preferring of charges on the relevant date based, as these were, on the report of an SIO who had procured a significant plank of the proposed Crown case by committing the crime which the judge held that DCS Cook had committed. Such a prosecutor would, I am convinced, have wanted DCS Cook, and any influence deriving from him, to be cleared from the scene and a fresh untainted assessment made of the remaining evidence before considering again whether a prosecution should be brought. Given the circumstances, the prosecutor would have wanted to be assured that the taint of DCS Cook’s conduct had not otherwise affected the investigation. The case would have had to be assessed from an unaffected point of view.
  3. Further, the prosecutor would have noted that much of the remaining evidence had previously been rejected as giving sufficient ground for a prosecution and that some of the other evidence later obtained had come from witnesses of highly doubtful credibility. In reaching a decision, in my judgment, the technical admissibility of the other evidence would only have been a part of the judgment call for the CPS. There would have been other issues, as I have sought to explain. As Mr Simblet submitted, the learned judge focused solely on the technical admissibility of the remaining evidence at the date of the prosecution decision (without Eaton) but without taking into account what Mr Simblet (I think accurately) described as the “stench” that would have been given off by the apparent results of the investigation by DCS Cook’s actions while at the very top of the investigation team.
  4. I do not ignore the fact that the prosecution was not abandoned immediately after Maddison J had ruled against the admissibility of Eaton’s evidence. However, continuing with a long running prosecution is one thing and deciding to initiate one is another. Maddison J’s reasoned judgment on Eaton’s evidence was not delivered until a year after his decision to exclude it was communicated to the parties. His ruling was given on 15 February 2010 but his judgment was only handed down on 25 March 2011, shortly after the Crown had discontinued the prosecution. In February 2010, it may have been thought that there was just enough, as I put it to counsel in argument, “to keep the damaged aircraft in the air sufficiently long enough to clear a hedge”, but that did not mean that the aircraft would have taken off at all if the pilot had realised that it was so seriously damaged already when it was still sitting on the airfield before take-off.


  1. I would endorse, without reservation, the conclusion of McCombe LJ that DCS Cook was a prosecutor who acted maliciously. McCombe LJ observes that any other finding would be a “negation of the rule of law” [91], and Coulson LJ that it would be “contrary to basic principle”. I agree that that is undoubtedly the case and, in my view, any other conclusion would, in the eyes of the general public, defy common sense.
  2. This is a case where no one has been tried or convicted of a particularly brutal murder. It is of importance that where serious and damaging findings of malicious prosecution and of misfeasance in public office are sought against the MPC in such a case, that the public can understand and appreciate the logic of the outcome. With respect to this very experienced judge, the outcome which he reached namely, that although acting corruptly DCS Cook was not also acting maliciously, may well appear to be counterintuitive to any ordinary member of the public.
  3. To say that DCS Cook, a prosecutor guilty of perverting the course of justice by creating false evidence against the appellants, was, on account of his belief in their guilt, not acting maliciously, is rather like saying that Robin Hood was not guilty of theft. One understands the motivation in each case, but any seeming endorsement of such dishonest behaviour, particularly within the police force, leads as McCombe LJ puts it, to a (serious and unacceptable) “negation of the rule of law”.


    1. I agree that, for the reasons set out in detail by McCombe LJ, this appeal should be allowed. I wanted to add some words of my own because I am conscious of both the expertise of the judge at first instance and the careful judgment which he produced, from which we are now departing.However, I am satisfied that this court is not reconsidering the fact-finding exercise already carried out by Mitting J: rather, it is correcting his errors of principle and then, with the right approach in mind, addressing the facts which he set out in his judgment.
    2. I consider that, in accordance with the authorities, DCS Cook was a prosecutor: paragraphs 55-58 of McCombe LJ’s analysis admit of no other conclusion. Equally, I am in no doubt that DCS Cook acted maliciously: as McCombe LJ notes at paragraph 91, any other finding, on the facts of this case, would be a negation of the rule of law. It would be contrary to basic principle to find, as the judge did, that a senior policeman can pervert the course of justice to create false evidence against the appellants, but not be guilty of malice simply because he personally believed them to be guilty of Daniel Morgan’s murder. That would amount to an endorsement of DCS Cook’s criminal conduct and his view that the ends justified the means, which I emphatically reject.
    3. Furthermore, the finding of malice seems to me to make it impossible for this court to reach any conclusion (on the facts as found by the judge) other than that the prosecutor – in this case DCS Cook – did not have the necessary subjective belief that there was RPC. The appellants made detailed submissions to the effect that, not only could the respondent not show subjective RPC, but that this was not an element of the case that the respondent had ever properly grappled with. They said that, in consequence, they won on causation. Mr Johnson QC did not address that in his submissions. In my view, for the reasons summarised by McCombe LJ at paragraph 75, this means that, regardless of the position in respect of objective RPC, the appeal must succeed.
    4. There is however a fourth difficulty for the respondent which, in my view, is also fatal to the respondent’s case. That concerns the inter-relationship between DCS Cook’s wrongful acts and the evidence of Eaton. The criticality of Eaton’s evidence can be summarised as follows:
i) Before Operation Abelard II, there was no reasonable and probable cause to prosecute the appellants. That was why they had not been prosecuted. As a result of Abelard II, it was decided that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them.
ii) The report prepared by Beswick about Operation Abelard II said that there was “new and compelling” evidence to justify prosecution (Judgment, paragraph 114). That evidence was from Ward and Eaton. However, the report expressly said that Ward’s evidence “in isolation was unlikely to be sufficient to prosecute this case” (Judgment, paragraph 115).
iii) Accordingly, on the analysis in Mitting J’s judgment, the critical element in the decision to prosecute the appellants after so long was the new evidence of Eaton.
iv) However, as DCS Cook knew, Eaton’s evidence was entirely contaminated by his unlawful actions. That was subsequently confirmed when Eaton’s evidence was ruled by Maddison J to be inadmissible.
v) On one view, therefore, the absence of Eaton’s evidence removed the critical element in the decision to prosecute in 2008, which in turn meant that there was no RPC.
  1. But in my view, the analysis cannot stop there. Although Mitting J rightly said that, for the purposes of RPC and causation, he had to assume that Eaton’s evidence had never been available (see paragraphs 158 and 191 of the Judgment), that was only half the exercise he was obliged to do. In my view, he had to go on and ask himself whether the criminal proceedings would have been commenced against the appellants in circumstances where, not only was Eaton’s evidence unavailable, but where it was also known that his “new and compelling” evidence had only been obtained through the criminal conduct of the Senior Investigating Officer. In other words, it was insufficient for the judge merely to subtract Eaton’s evidence from the equation; he also had to consider the contaminating effect of DCS Cook’s criminal conduct, across the case as a whole, when deciding whether or not the appellants would have been prosecuted.
  2. That was not a question that the judge asked himself. If he had done so, given our views on malice and subjective belief, and given all the circumstances of this case, I consider that he would inevitably have concluded that there was no RPC, and that therefore both the malicious prosecution case and the misfeasance case (which only failed before Mitting J on causation) would have succeeded.
  3. There is one final point that I would wish to make. The key question with which both Mitting J and this court have wrestled was whether or not, absent Eaton and the actions of DCS Cook, there was the necessary RPC. Considerable court and judicial resources have been expended on endeavouring to answer this question: the original trial took 3 weeks, and the appeal a full one and a half days, involving 6 counsel, including 2 QCs. And yet it is likely that the answer to that very question was contained in the contemporaneous documents relating to the original decision to charge, for which the CPS did not waive privilege.
  4. I accept that the CPS are entitled not to waive privilege for such documents and we have been scrupulous to avoid drawing any adverse inference at all from their absence, even though this has allowed the appellants to submit that the CPS and/or police have a policy of disclosing the charge documents when it helps them, and not when it does not. That submission was based on the fact that, in the similar case of Mouncher v Chief Constable of South Wales [2016] EWHC 1367 (QB), privilege in this same class of documents was waived.
  5. It seems to me that, in circumstances where the funding for both the Court Service and the CPS comes out of the same MoJ budget, and at a time when budgetary constraints within the MoJ are all-pervasive, it is an obvious waste of valuable resources for courts to spend time trying to answer complex hypothetical questions without sight of the documents that are likely to contain the answers. This issue needs to be considered at the highest level of the CPS: I am not satisfied that its consequences have been fully grasped by those responsible for defending this (and other similar) claims.


Mark Maxey // As Indigenous people have long known, child separation is an American tradition – People’s World

Echoes of ‘white man’s burden’ per imperialist Kipling.

Modern AfroIndio Times

As Indigenous people have long known, child separation is an American tradition – People’s World: For Indian children, the boarding school experience began in 1860, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs established the first such institution on the Yakima Reservation in Washington state. The idea for such schools was devised by well-meaning middle class ‘reformers’ in the east like Herbert Welsh and Henry Pancoast, who had founded the Indian Rights Association to advocate for treaty rights after visiting Sioux agencies in Dakota.

“The goal of these reformers,” according to Northern Plains Reservation Aid, “was to use education as a tool to ‘assimilate’ Indian tribes into the mainstream of the ‘American way of life’.” The thought was that Indian children, by being placed into boarding schools, would absorb an appreciation for private property, material wealth, the Protestant work ethic, and monogamous nuclear families.

White men’s beliefs and social principles were…

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Reading the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill on the train

“I don’t know if I’m missing something, but I’ve read Schedule AA1 twice now and can’t see anything comparable to these information rights. So how is P (or P’s representatives) supposed to learn about the basis for the detention, or get hold of the authorisations or statements underpinning it? Is this an accidental omission (and if so, it’s a bit of a clanger) or is this a deliberate decision that it would be too upsetting to talk to the person about this…? Either way, it seems like a fairly straightforward breach of Article 5(2) if information rights aren’t inserted into the legislation.”

The Small Places

I’m on a train heading home from Leeds after a really exciting, challenging, and thought provoking workshop that I helped to set up with CHANGE and Advonet, looking at how we can bring together people with learning disabilities and those working within the services and agencies that they use, to think about supported decision making.  One of the greatest challenges of this workshop was tackling the huge power imbalances that arise around language, and the ease with which we lapse into jargon and service speak that alienates the people who don’t speak this language.  We certainly didn’t do this perfectly, but it was an attempt to find new ways of working with that, and we all I think learned a lot.

So it was with a bit of a sinking feeling that I settled down to read the new Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill that had its first reading before Parliament…

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“The reason why the Court of Appeal said that it is of particular importance that solicitors are held liable for the conduct of anyone to whom they contract work when those subcontractors are not themselves authorised is that such unauthorised subcontractors do not owe an independent duty to the court.”

Kerry Underwood

In Gempride Ltd v Bamrah and another [2018] EWCA Civ 1367, 21 June 2018

the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against a Circuit Judge’s decision to overturn the order of a Costs Master who had disallowed the claimant her costs, utilising the provisions of CPR 44.11, having found misconduct on her behalf in relation to detailed assessment proceedings.

Here the claimant was a solicitor whose own firm initially acted for her in a personal injury claim and the Master found that she had certified a misleading bill of costs and had given untrue information about the funding of the case.

The personal injury case settled for £50,000 shortly after proceedings had been issued.

The claimant had claimed over £900,000.

The appeal by the solicitor against the Master’s order occupied a Circuit Judge for 13 days and the Circuit Judge allowed the solicitor’s appeal, finding that the claimant’s solicitor was…

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#CivilLitigation #Appeals #InadequateReasons


In Drury v Rafique & Anor [2018] EWHC 1527 (Ch) Mr Justice Birss gave important guidance to those thinking of appealing a judgment on the basis of inadequate reasons. It is dangerous for an appellant to appeal on this grounds without asking the judge to expand their reasons.


The appellant had obtained an interlocutory judgment against the defendants, alleging that construction work was likely to encroach on a gas flue on his property. The appellant gave an undertaking in damages.  A jointly instructed expert determined that there was no encroachment and the respondents sought damages on the basis of the undertaking as to damages.  Damages were awarded on that undertaking in the sum of £22,860.  The appellant appealed that judgment. One of the grounds of appeal was that inadequate reasons had been given by the trial judge.


    1. The appellant appeals with permission given by Garnham J on 9th March 2018. The appellant’s main case on appeal was that the assessment of damages was flawed because judge failed to give any or any adequate reasons for his conclusions or to deal with all the areas of controversy and that he misunderstood the evidence. The appellant submits that none of the heads damages claimed should have been accepted. The respondents supported the judge, denying that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons and denied he misunderstood the evidence.
    2. The appellant also contended that neither the order relating to the gas flue nor the indemnity costs order should have been made. The appellant submissions are the following: the gas flue order was wrong because in making it the judge erred in giving weight to the opinion of the single joint expert since that opinion was about a legal consequence and not a matter of expert opinion or a description of factual observations. The indemnity costs order was wrong because the judge had not been asked to make an order for indemnity costs and did not do so; if the judge thought indemnity costs might be correct he should have invited submissions on the point.
Appeal on damages
    1. Despite the fact that a failure to give adequate reasons was put at the forefront of the appellant’s case relating to damages, no attempt was made to invite the judge to consider whether to amplify his reasons before complaining about their inadequacy on appeal. Counsel for the respondents submitted this was contrary to the guidance given by Wilson LJ in Paulin v Paulin [2010] 1 WLR 1057 at paragraph 30(a). Counsel for the appellant’s response as I understood it was that there would have been no point in doing so given that his client had lost. That is wrong. It seems to be on the assumption that the reasons would have rejected the appellant’s case on the topics he says were not covered. That is no excuse but even if it is what would have happened, the approach the appellant has therefore taken runs a real risk of unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings. If the appeal court rejects the submission that the reasons are inadequate then that is one thing, but if the reasons are lacking then it does not follow that the right thing to do is conduct a rehearing on appeal without the benefit of hearing the witnesses. The right thing to do might be to direct a retrial, which would have been entirely unnecessary if the judge had had the opportunity to amplify his reasons.
    2. A judge’s duty to give reasons was explained in Flannery v Halifax Estate Agents [2000] 1 WLR 377 at 381 g-h. These principles were not in dispute:
“(1) The duty is a function of due process, and therefore of justice. Its rationale has two principal aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the parties – especially the losing party – should be left in no doubt why they have won or lost. This is especially so since without reasons the losing party will not know (as was said in Ex p. Dave) whether the court has misdirected itself, and thus whether he may have an available appeal on the substance of the case. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not.
(2) The first of these aspects implies that want of reasons may be a good self-standing ground of appeal. Where because no reasons are given it is impossible to tell whether the judge has gone wrong on the law or the facts, the losing party would be altogether deprived of his chance of an appeal unless the court entertains an appeal based on the lack of reasons itself.
(3) The extent of the duty, or rather the reach of what is required to fulfil it, depends on the subject-matter. Where there is a straightforward factual dispute whose resolution depends simply on which witness is telling the truth about events which he claims to recall, it is likely to be enough for the judge (having, no doubt, summarised the evidence) to indicate simply that he believes X rather than Y; indeed there may be nothing else to say. But where the dispute involves something in the nature of an intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis advanced on either side, the judge must enter into the issues canvassed before him and explain why he prefers one case over the other. This is likely to apply particularly in litigation where as here there is disputed expert evidence; but it is not necessarily limited to such cases.
(4) This is not to suggest that there is one rule for cases concerning the witnesses’ truthfulness or recall of events, and another for cases where the issue depends on reasoning or analysis (with experts or otherwise). The rule is the same: the judge must explain why he has reached his decision. The question is always, what is required of the judge to do so; and that will differ from case to case. Transparency should be the watchword.”
  1. Picking up on paragraph (2) from Flannery, there was an attempt to suggest on this appeal that one could not tell whether the judge had erred in law because the judge had not set out the propositions of law. However the legal propositions which related to the issues the judge had to decide were entirely uncontroversial and straightforward on the facts of this case. They are that the respondents had to prove their case, and the damages on a cross-undertaking are assessed on contractual principles (Abbey Forwarding v Hone [2014] EWCA Civ 711) this not being a case which might engage the exceptions to that principle. The appellant has no specific point to make about any particular point of law. The judgment cannot be criticised for not setting them out.”

Social Worker Justifies Breaking The Law Inside The Child Protection System

‘The piece comes at a delicate moment in Britain’s social work history. As local authorities continue to ignore Guidance and best practice, ongoing failings and high profile cases exposing malpractice and misconduct sit at odds with a growing number of social workers who want to develop best practice and ethical policies inside child protection. The author of the piece, who is allegedly a children’s social worker, tries to suggest that social workers breaking the law are doing so because they want to do what’s best for the children inside the system. Unfortunately, the system is so broken, and resources so scarce, that most of the time, finding out what that might be is virtually impossible. Social workers are only too aware of this.

The author is also careful not to call out malpractice and law breaking, instead choosing to refer to these abuses as “misuses of power”, or a desire to “act around the law”.’
The morally bankrupt policy of commodifying children for corporate profit causes conscientious and open-minded social workers to quit while those who cut corners to get results to get promoted. It’s hidden cost is too high on so many levels.

Researching Reform

A social worker who has chosen to remain anonymous, has told online social work magazine Community Care that child protection professionals break the law in order to do what’s best for children inside the family justice system.

The piece comes after a family court ruling highlighted the widespread misuse of Section 20 arrangements , which were being used to keep children detained in state care, illegally and for lengthy periods. Social workers were also failing to obtain court orders to implement these arrangements.

Section 20 arrangements are voluntary agreements which give parents the option of placing their children in state care, where the parents need respite or are unable to look after their children for short periods. Children can leave the accommodation provided for them at any time, and without notice. Parents can also remove their children from the accommodation without requiring local authority consent to do so.

Outgoing President…

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Brexit and the EU Settlement Scheme

“The above discussion is only an initial excursion into Brexit’s impact on the future of EU immigration in the UK. Since the referendum was really a snap vote on immigration rather than the merits of leaving the EU, we will have to hang on tight and wait and see what the future holds. Because it will be very easy for the government of the day to change the content of Appendix EU, it is fair to say that those blindly applauding Sajid Javid and his department for the scheme resemble the characters in Alice in Wonderland. Ultimately, like the referendum result itself, history will best judge these developments. And in my view history will not look kindly on Appendix EU. Nor should it.”

United Kingdom Immigration Law Blog

As if Appendix FM and its sinister siblings were not enough, soon free movement law will interact with the Immigration Rules in the form of Appendix EU so as to implement settled status for EU citizens and their family members. The tactic of using Appendix EU is dubious because, as Lord Hope memorably said in Odelola [2009] UKHL 25, “the status of the immigration rules is rather unusual.” The rules are not subordinate legislation. Instead, they are detailed statements by a minister on how the Crown intends to exercise its executive power to control immigration. Although the rules create legal rights, Parliament’s involvement is not required to change them. Permanent residence under Appendix EU will be conferred in digitalised form through a new streamlined system. Excited legal pundits have praised the ambitious new system because it does not require applicants to give up their passports and also stealthily synchronises…

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The Mystery Beneath Masjid Al Aqsa and the Dajjalic “New World Order”

Respect existence or expect resistance!
Fact: Musjid al Aqsa is Islam’s first Qibla, second musjid ever built and third haram.

Islam Reigns


“THE ARK OF COVENANT” [ Taboot e Sakeenah]

King Sulayman Alaihissalaam was the king of what would now be recognized as ancient Bani Israa’eel and is recognized as a prophet and divinely-appointed monarch. Muslim belief holds that Sulayman Alaihissalaam was one of the elect of Allah, and was bestowed upon with many God-given gifts, including the ability to speak to animals and control jinn.

Muslims further maintain that Solomon remained faithful to a one and only God throughout his life; constructed the Temple of Sulayman (The first Temple), which became one of the key houses of worship for Jews; reigned justly over the whole of Israel; was blessed with a level of kingship which was given to none after him; and fulfilled all of his commandments, being promised nearness to Allah in Heaven at the end of his life. Nabi Sulayman Alaihissalaam remains one of the most commemorated and popular…

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Autism and Deprivation of Liberty: The Shocking Tale of What the State is Doing

Planet Autism Blog

Deprivation of Liberty The Government created an Autism Act in 2009 for adults on the autistic spectrum.  Then it created an adults Autism Strategy (ironically entitled “Leading Fulfilling and Rewarding Lives”) in 2010, to remind authorities that there was an Autism Act and that they were meant to be adhering to it – just spelling it out sort of thing.  When people kept on reporting that things still weren’t being done as they were supposed to, despite the Act and the Strategy, the Government next created their “Think Autism” Strategy in 2014 just to remind them again (just how dense can these people be!).  What is all this achieving?  The Government can hold it’s hands up and say, “Look, we made a law for you, we did our bit, look how seriously we are taking this.”  …We all know what the term ‘lip service’ means though.

Some autistic adults are getting deflected…

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