Triggering Article 50, with reason…

“Supreme Court and meaning of referendum:…
Administrative law and the rule of reason
Short essay on ‘rule of reason’:
Start from Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, [1968] 2 WLR 924
Unfettered discretion: contradiction in terms
Special care for ministerial decisions
Conclusion: reasonable to trigger Art 50?
‘Will of the people in referendum’
Burke’s theory: needs revisiting in 2017: mandate or representative
No white paper
No account taken of situation in 2017: May’s blinkered approach is the antithesis of reason
Is an electorate which votes in a simple binary elect capable of ‘reason’ in the administrative law sense of the term?”


[This is a holding note: further sections need to be added on ‘rule of reason’ and the consequences if Mrs May’s reason is not exercised, or is exercised unreasonably.]

Mrs May and ‘the rule of reason’: some notes

It is too late to do much about MPs and what seems to be their minimal understanding of the meaning and consequences of a referendum; and thus to stop the passage of the Article 50 bill. This is the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (the 2017 Bill) whose short title is: to confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.

Once the bill is law – has been given Royal Assent – then the landscape changes for political to administrative. We are back to executive or government powers; and then…

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| Exposing Truth Behind Media Spin. Truth is not gossip. It's not sensational or even exciting. Truth's reality, fact. Truth's shocking, sad, horrific, frightening and deadly. Controversial issues discussed here so only for those able to digest Truth.

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